Introduction
In contrast, the decentralized scheme is much flexible.
It behaves similar to the manners of Peer-to-Peer (P2P)
networks. This is due to the fact that most of decentralized schemes are developed on top of P2P network protocols. we analyze the results for the overall performance evaluation of applying multi-domain collaboration for distributed defense. Section 6 concludes our work.
Related Work
In network security systems, it is common at the abstract level on that multiple end-hosts work collaboratively against attacks [15, 16, 19, 23] [4, 28, 36] .
Beyond collaboration at the victim end, deploying network security systems into network fabric increases the initiative of defense system. Gamer et al. [9] extended their research to achieve a coordinated collaboration among independent systems for anomaly-based attack detection. Their approach combines an in-network deployment of neighboring detection systems with information exchanging. Working in a self-organized manner, however, each network node makes decision independently.
Taking advantages of the P2P network, researchers attempted to address the major challenges in large scale collaboration: the scalability and avoidance of central point of failure [32] . They merged multi-dimensional correlation for collaborative intrusion detection [33] , and developed a self-protecting and self-healing collaborative intrusion detection architecture for the trace-back of fast flux phishing domains [34] .
A Distributed Change-point Detection (DCD) scheme was proposed to detect DDoS attack over multiple network domains [30] , [29] . Distributed information is collected through Change Aggregation Tree (CAT) for centralized analysis and decision-making [27] . Another collaborative approach was designed to detect and stop DDoS attacks at the intermediate network [31] . To achieve this purpose, detection nodes are deployed at both victim and source ends for collaborative detection [35] . In a more ambitious approach based on the DefCOM [18] scheme, the collaborative nodes are deployed all over the network.
Not only the victim end and the source end, the intermediate network is also included [20] .
The Internet could be considered as a complex system.
All network activities, including attack and defense could be treated as subsets of it. From this perspective, it is practical to study the behaviors of network security activities using complex system models. The earliest effort using complex system for the modeling of distributed network defense schemes was proposed in 2001 [8] .
However, not much other similar research has been reported since then, to the best of our knowledge. Different from their proposal of only describing a preliminary agent based model without concrete experiments, this paper presents our efforts in a specific evaluation based on a more deliberate three-layered network model.
Small-World Network Based Modeling Platform
Many network security applications are based on traffic monitoring. The more traffic information is obtained, the more confident security applications are. In order to achieve the best performance, security applications are preferable to be deployed at the gateway of the intended networks. In practice, it has been a trend to integrate traffic monitoring functions into routers for a simple solution.
Nowadays, many advanced commercial-available routers are security enhanced. Not only software applications are implemented, hardware based applications are also embedded for advanced security improvement.
Essentially, distributed collaborative security defense is set up on top the cooperation of their corresponding network devices. The upper-level application chooses the countermeasure, while the lower-level agent supports its execution. Special channels are reserved for this collaboration, in order to avoid the interference with normal traffic. In this section, taking advantage of small world network theory, an abstract three-layer platform is built for this modeling study.
Small World Network
The real Internet is a scale-free network [2] . A scale free network is a network whose degree distribution approximately follows the power law [3] . Most nodes in a scale-free network have only one or two links, while only a few nodes have a large numbers of links. These small portion numbers of nodes act as hubs responding for the connection of the whole network. Rc without passing Rb. Therefore, routers R., Rb, and Rc play critical roles as gateway hubs bringing local network A, B and C together to form a larger network.
The theory of small-world network well describes a simplified scale-free network. A small-world network is a network being mostly local-connected but with a few global connections. In fact, many real-world networks could be well described using small-world network models, such as cells [14] , social networks [25] , World
Wide Web [11] and the Internet [1] . Watts and Strogatz model is the most famous small-world network model. It is a random graph generation model that produces graphs with short average path lengths and high clustering [26] .
It is the foundation of our modeling platform. Figure 3 shows an example generated with the specific approach that we employed to construct such a small world network. The whole network contains 50 nodes.
Each node is connected to 2 nearest neighbors and has the probability of 0.175 to add another edge. Small world networks set up the basic topology for our intended network layers.
Structure of Three-layered Modeling Platform
As demonstrated in Figure 4 , the platform that we developed for the modeling of collaborative schemes consists of three layers. From the bottom to the top, they
, � , In the Internet layer, the six-degree-of-separation theory [17] points it out that the average width of a large scale network is six. Specific to the Internet, relative research [29] has statistically verified that more than 99% of network domains in Internet could be reached within six hops. In our work, the weight assigned to the associated 
Internet Worm Attack and Defense
Based on above developed modeling platform, a preliminary study comparing three different defense schemes has been conducted to investigate their performance against a typical Internet worm attack. This section describes the following two parts: modeling a worm attack, and modeling corresponding defense schemes.
Modeling a Worm Attack
Featuring self-duplication and automatic propagation, Internet worms are truly autonomous during attack. They are able to spread over the network, breaking into end hosts and replicating. It is extremely challenging to prevent Zero-day worms. In addition, worms themselves Various strategies have been adopted to achieve fast propagation, such as exploring security holes, increasing scanning rate with different scanning schemes [7, 24] . In the centralized scheme, all the collaborative activities run under a root-leaves structure. A centralizer acts as the root that is in charge of the whole collaboration.
It may locate in any of the participating network domains.
This centralizer has reliable communication with all the participants. Security applications act as leaves, collecting and pre-screening useful information to the root. Through the analysis of gathered information, corresponding feedback is returned from the root to all the leaves.
Obviously, the overall efficiency of agents running under this scheme is more consistent than what the decentralized scheme can achieve.
Experiments and Performance Evaluation
This section presents the simulation results and the performance evaluation of this preliminary comparison study. The simulation experiment is discussed in detail, including the basic assumptions, parameters, and attack and-defense operations. Through the analysis of simulation results, the performance of both centralized, decentralized collaboration schemes for distributed defense and the single-point scheme for individual defense have been evaluated.
Simulation Setup
In simulation, the operation of attack and defense is relatively independent from each other. According to the platform shown in Figure The appearance of the first infected node triggers the worm attack towards the interested network area. This node is randomly selected from the interested network domains in the Internet layer at the beginning of the simulation. After that, worms propagate following the described modeling approach.
Meanwhile, the location of the centralizer is also randomly assigned to one of the participant network domains. Through the association with its related defense agent, it records all the shortest paths from the related agent to all the other agents as defined in the overlay network layer. The structure for centralized collaboration is set up during the initialization of simulation.
The first alarm for worm detection from a defense agent triggers the whole defense reaction. This triggering event is associated with the progress of worm propagation.
With the propagation of worms through the network space, the probability of being detected also grows. The worm packets are detectable once corresponding signatures have been identified [5] .
Basically, our simulation process follows the adaptive SIR model as show in Figure 5 For simplicity, we just assume that the time delay for one node infection is one unit time slot.
Considering that transferring lOOk data in 100M/bps takes I ms, while infecting a node takes a few seconds. It is obvious that the infection time is dominative in a simple worm propagation scenario. From the perspective of defenders, the time for alarm spreading is expected to be short due to the utilization of reserved channel for collaboration. However, the overhead that resulted from the collaboration among different agents is non-trivial.
To describe the variable security vulnerabilities that network domains possess, we randomly assigned the resistant time of each network domain to worm attack Although it may be disputable that worm signatures are generated and ready for spread just one unit time later after the worm alarm is issued in our simulation, it does not affect the relative defending trends after the knowledge update processing is finished in local agents. The only difference lies on the start point for reaction along the time axle during simulation.
Experimental Results and Discussion
According to the above description, we conducted In order to present a clear view of their variation, we used the log scale of the representation of values in Y ax is.
The number of infection nodes stays small at the both ends, but it is large in the middle. This is because the exponential increase of worm propagation usually happens in the middle with respect to the whole progress. Figure 7 shows the alarm spreading after the worm attack is detected. The purple line across through the end to-end fr om the left-bottom to the right-up represents the referred number of infected nodes. It is identical to the red infection line in Figure 6 . The shape is different because Y axis is normal scaled, which represents the number of alarmed nodes. One difference between the centralized and the de-centralized collaborative schemes is that the knowledge update or alarm generated by the center server is sent to each agent to contain the worms, not by itself.
In this simulation, it is assumed that when 60% of the network domains have been infected, the worm is detected and the fust alarm is generated. In Figure 7 , the blue cubic box on the purple curve marks this point.
Referring to the X axis, it is time for issuing the first alarm fr om that agent. The red line represents the agents working under single-point defense scheme, the blue and green lines represent agents working under centralized and decentralized defense schemes, respectively.
As expected, the red line is almost flat during the whole simulation period since none of the peer agent is expected to be able to share the alarm. For centralized and decentralized schemes, the alarm quickly spreads to all the defense agents through the topology built in the overlay network layer. This topology models the paths for collaboration. It is obvious that centralized scheme is more efficient for alarm spreading with the same set of collaborative nodes and the same network topology. 
The SIR Model
For further insight of the impact of different defense schemes, we simulated the defeat scenario. Once a worm attack has been detected and an alarm has been issued, the security agent continues to update its knowledge base and spread the newly generated signatures to peers for worm containment. Through sharing the signatures database, other agents can effectively prevent the attack. 
Conclusion
This paper reports our efforts of a comparison study on the characteristics of different collaborative defense schemes against the Internet worm attacks. Based on the small-world network model, our experimental results have verified that both centralized and decentralized collaborative schemes can effectively improve the system performance comparing to single-point defense scheme.
Based on a survey of related work, most reported research is application-dependable and specific problem based solution.
Our work provides a new insight of collaborative strategies on a higher abstract level. 
